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Abstract
We present an implementation of Rijndael for wireless sensor networks running on Eyes sensor nodes.
In previous works, Rijndael has not been considered a suitable encryption algorithm for sensor nodes
because it is too slow and requires a large space in memory, a precious resource in this environment. Our
implementation of Rijndael is smaller, from about 1/3 to 1/5 of the size of previous implementations.
Furthermore, we observe that nowadays MAC and routing protocols for wireless sensor networks, exhibit
latencies up to few seconds, and thus the few milliseconds required by Rijndael to encrypt a TinyOS
message are negligible if compared to these latencies. For this reason, in our opinion the main focus on the
implementation of encryption algorithms for wireless sensor networks should move from speed, to memory
occupation and energy eﬃciency.
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1 Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is an ad-hoc wireless network made of sensor
nodes which are able to monitor events (e.g. seismic activity, animals moving in a
forest, enemies or intruders entering a monitored area, chemical agents), to process
the sensed data and to communicate these data to a central node, the sink. The
sink is a powerful base station which gathers data sensed in the network and either
processes them or acts as gateway to other networks.
Sensor nodes are typically battery powered, making sensor networks highly en-
ergy constrained. Replacing batteries on hundreds or thousands of nodes, often
deployed in inaccessible environments, is infeasible or too costly. Therefore, a key
challenge in a wireless sensor networks is the reduction of energy consumption. For
this reason most of the research in this ﬁeld is focused on the development of energy
eﬃcient media access control (MAC) and routing algorithms.
Nevertheless sensor networks are becoming a cost-eﬀective solution to a range
of applications in critical domains. For example, after the recent terroristic events,
there is a pressing need for the deployment of eﬃcient and low-cost infrastructures
for the detection of chemical or biological agents. When sensor networks are used
in these security domains, besides energy eﬃciency, security become a strong and
important requirement. Indeed these applications should not only timely detect a
potential risk, but should also be protected from malicious attacks such as for ex-
ample fake messages (i.e. an attacker injects malicious data which are erroneously
interpreted by the system) or corrupted data (i.e. the attacker manipulate data in
order to disguise the real information).
Motivation. Sensors are still some time away from actual mass fabrication and
use.
Most of the current nodes, such as the Eyes node (http://www.eyes.eu.org/)
or the TMote (http://www.moteiv.com/), typically run the TinyOS operating sys-
tem, and are equipped with temperature and humidity sensors. They also support
the installation of more advanced sensors such as microphones, accelerometers and
motion sensors. However sensors for detecting biomedical data [12], explosives, ra-
diation, chemical and biological toxins are becoming available. This paves the way
for new and interesting applications. In [1] the authors study the environmental
problems involving water quality and security. Clean waterways, and secure water
supply are our best protection from communicable disease and the eﬀects of chem-
ical and biological contaminants either accidentally or intentionally released to our
environment. Wireless sensor networks can be an integral part of military command,
control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and
targeting (C4ISRT) systems [2]. All the above applications have important security
requirements.
Security features such as authentication, authorization and conﬁdentiality (see
[8] for an extensive discussion of the unique security challenges in Wireless Sensor
Networks) can be implemented at two distinct network layers: link layer and ap-
A. Vitaletti, G. Palombizio / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 71–8172
plication layer. The use of link-layer cryptography in sensor networks is motivated
by two main reasons: i) in-network processing is a common feature in most of the
proposed communication protocols [15,4] and it requires intermediate nodes to ac-
cess and modify the content of messages, ii) if message integrity is only checked at
the ﬁnal destination, the network may route packets injected by an adversary many
hops before they are eventually detected. However, end-to-end security mechanisms
are still useful in sensor networks and may eﬀectively complement link-layer secu-
rity. Indeed end-to-end security naturally enforces security at application level and
can thus apply a suitable security level to each type of message generated by the
application. Consider for example a battle damage assessment scenario. We might
be interested in very high security level when reporting damages to strategic targets,
but we can accept even very low security level, or no security at all, when reporting
damages to insigniﬁcant targets. Observe that typically there are few important
strategic targets and many insigniﬁcant targets. The ability of applying a suitable
security level to each task, allow us to limit and control the overhead associated to
security. This is very important in such energy constraint environment.
Nowadays security architectures for sensor networks (see for example [6,9]) im-
plement ciphers such as RC5 or Skipjack. These algorithms can be considered secure
and eﬃcient in some environments. Nevertheless the current de facto Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) is Rjindael which is not usually adopted on sensor nodes.
Indeed the limited processing and memory resources on sensor nodes, make the
Rijndael implementations not eﬃcient and thus slow in running time.
Nevertheless, time required to encipher a typical TinyOS message by Rijndael
is about few milliseconds, while most of the MAC and routing protocols for sensor
networks [16,14,11] exhibit latencies of few seconds for routing packets. This is be-
cause these MACs exploit a short duty cycle (i.e. the fraction of time the radio of
a node is active, i.e. awake), to signiﬁcantly reduce the power consumption. This
diﬀerence between the few milliseconds to encipher a message and the few seconds
to route the message to the sink, make Rijndael a suitable solution for sensor net-
works. Indeed why focus on speed when we have in any case to wait until the radio
is awake to transmit a message? In our opinion, in this particular context, it would
be better to focus on the optimization of Rijndael energy eﬃciency and memory
occupation.
Our contribution. We implemented Rijndael on the Eyes sensor nodes. Ri-
jndael is well studied and there are eﬃcient implementations on a wide range of
platforms, such as 32-bit CPUs, 64-bit CPUs, cheap 8-bit smart-card CPUs, and
dedicated hardware. Nevertheless, as far as we know, there aren’t speciﬁc recom-
mendations for the implementation on 16-bit architecture, such as the Eyes node
platform. Our main contributions are:
• We discuss the importance of energy eﬃciency and memory occupation vs. speed
in the implementation of Rijndael on wireless sensor networks;
• We provide an implementation of Rijndael in software (TinyOS), that uses from
about 1/3 to about 1/5 of the memory required by previous implementations;
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• Our AES implementation can be exploited both for data-link encryption and
for end-to-end encryption. We developed a TinyOS module which allow us to
encrypt messages at application layer. This module, can possibly run on top of
and eﬀectively complement TinySec(a fully-implemented protocol for link-layer
cryptography in sensor networks);
• We ﬁnally show a preliminary performance evaluation of our implementation. Our
result show that AES can be eﬀectively used for symmetric encryption, improving
security at the cost of some degradation in speed.
2 Related Work
In [7] the authors present a detailed benchmark on block ciphers for wireless sensor
networks. They consider security properties, storage and energy-eﬃciency of a set
of candidates: RC5, RC6, Rijndael, MISTY1, KASUMI and Camellia. All these
algorithms have been implemented and tested on Eyes sensor nodes and a ranking
on the algorithms in terms of code-memory, data-memory and speed is provided.
RC5 requires little code and data memory, but it is slow on speed. While RC6
excels in small code size, it is the slowest even after speed optimization. Speed-
optimized Rijndael oﬀers the highest speed but has a large code size. Indeed this
implementation of Rijndael is 15842 bytes (CBC mode) for speed-optimized code,
and 14716 bytes (CBC mode) for size-optimized code. Since this is almost a quarter
of the ﬂash memory of a Eyes node, this solution might be considered unpractical
in many scenarios.
We observe that the performance provided in [7] are in contrast with those pro-
vided in [3]. Indeed in [3], RC5 is reported to have a speed higher than Rijndael.
All the above experiments have been performed in standalone mode, namely with-
out interaction with the OS. Most of the ciphers code used in [7], has been taken
from OpenSSL as it is, without any particular optimization for the Eyes platform.
This justify a further eﬀort in implementing a Rijndael algorithm for Eyes hardware
which is smaller in size and provides reasonable speed performance.
In [5] the authors use an AES implementation, but they do not provide any per-
formance evaluation. In [13] the authors quantify the energy cost of authentication
and key exchange based on a public-key cryptography on the 8-bit ATMEL AT-
MEGA128L microcontroller platform. They also used an AES assembly implemen-
tation for symmetric encryption/decryption.
TinySec [6] is the ﬁrst fully-implemented protocol for link-layer cryptography in
sensor networks. TinySec supports two diﬀerent security options: authenticated en-
cryption (TinySec-AE) and authentication only (TinySec-Auth). In authenticated
encryption, TinySec encrypts the data payload and authenticates the packet with
a message authentication code. Authentication only mode allows us to authenti-
cate the entire packet with the TinySec message authentication code, but the data
payload is not encrypted. The authors found RC5 and Skipjack ciphers to be most
appropriate for software implementation on embedded microcontrollers. They wrote
that Rijndael is too slow, but in a note of the paper is written:“... AES can be im-
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plemented eﬃciently on our platform, with performance not much worse than RC5
and Skipjack”. Unfortunately they did not provide any further information.
The paper evaluates TinySec performance by experiments. TinySec energy con-
sumption, even when used in the most resource-intensive and most secure mode, is
a modest 10%, and the low impacts on bandwidth and latency prove that software
based link-layer security is a feasible solution for sensor networks. The same authors
recognize, however, that end-to-end security mechanisms are still useful in sensor
networks and may eﬀectively complement TinySec.
In [3] an Intrusion-tolerant routing protocol for WSN is presented. The authors im-
plemented both RC5 and AES. The Rijndael implementation requires about 9Kbyte,
but speed performance are quite poor, about 100ms for ciphering 128 bit on a At-
mega128.
Finally in [9], Perrig et al. present a suite of security building blocks optimized for
resource constrained environments and wireless communication. In particular the
authors present SNEP for data conﬁdentiality and two-party data authentication,
and μTESLA for authenticated broadcast.
3 Keying mechanisms
A key mechanism is designed to distribute and share cryptographic keys over the
network. We can roughly identify two main keying mechanisms:
Single shared key. In this case all the nodes in the network are provided with a
single shared key. Key distribution is simple, indeed a common assumption is that
the shared key is loaded into nodes before deployment. However this mechanism
cannot protect against tampering. In other words if an adversary can break a node
and access the shared secret, she can eavesdrop on traﬃc and inject messages in the
network.
Per-link key. In this case two nodes share a key if and only if they can commu-
nicate, namely if they are neighbors. Thus, each couple of nodes share a distinct
per-link key. This implies a quite challenging key distribution mechanism, but en-
force an higher security level. Indeed, even breaking a node, an adversary can
only eavesdrop traﬃc directed to the broken node and possibly inject traﬃc to its
neighbors. An evolution of this scheme is group keying which also allows passive
participation and local broadcast.
In [10] the authors describe a probabilistic model and two protocols to establish
a secure pair-wise communication channel between any pair of sensors in the wireless
sensor network, by assigning a small set of random keys to each sensor.
In our work we used a simple extension of the single shared key mechanism.
Indeed we load a shared master key on the nodes. This master key is used to
exchange a session key, which is then used to encrypt end-to-end communications.
The validity of the key is limited to a single session or in some circumstances to a
fraction of the length of the session, depending on the level of security required.
A. Vitaletti, G. Palombizio / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 71–81 75
4 End-to-end security with Rijndael
In this paper we present an end-to-end security system based on Rijndael. Our sys-
tem can run on top of TinySec; at the moment, we demand message authentication
and integrity, to the underlay link-layer protocol. We stress that while TinySec is
fully implemented, our work is focused on ciphering messages at application level
with Rijndael and generating and exchanging keys.
4.1 Ciphering messages
In the previous sections, we have motivated the choice of Rijndael as our reference
encryption algorithm. Rijndael guarantees high security, but in order to build a
secure system, we must prevent adversaries from learning even partial information
from an enciphered message. The initialization vector (IV) and the mode of oper-
ation, have a great impact on the quality of a secure system. In the following, we
brieﬂy discuss the use of these two elements in our system.
Initialization Vector. Initialization vectors are used to prevent two identical
sequence of text from producing the same exact ciphertext when encrypted. Since
the receiver must know the IV to decrypt a message, the security of most encryp-
tion schemes do not rely on IVs being secret. We thus chose to transmit a 16 bits
initialization vector in clear. Since the IV must be communicated to the receiver,
a longer IV would require to reduce the available space for the payload, which is
already quite small (see section 4.2 for further details). For this reason we assume
16 bits a reasonable tradeoﬀ between security requirements - a long IV, means high
security - and space reserved for data transmission - a small IV subtracts less space
to the payload. Since AES requires an IV of 128 bits, the remaining bits are padded
by the receiver. In any case, this tradeoﬀ can be redeﬁned favoring security or space
for data.
Mode of operation. A block cipher, such as Rijndael, is a keyed pseudoran-
dom permutation over small bit strings, typically 8 or 16 bytes. Since we usually
want to encrypt messages longer than 8 or 16 bytes, block ciphers require a mode
of operation to encrypt longer messages. A mode of operation breaks the original
message in blocks of a suitable size, and thus allows the algorithm to cipher block
by block. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) is an operation mode which leaks only
a small amount of information in the presence of repeated IVs and it is provably
secure when IVs do not repeat. In most WSN scenarios, a typical data message
frequency is few messages per minute, and thus the time to exhaust all the possible
216 initialization vectors is quite long. When all the IVs are exhausted a new session
key must be generated.
A k-byte block cipher in CBC mode produces ciphertexts whose lengths are
multiples of k, in particular ciphering a message of length k + 1 results in a 2k
length ciphertext. Since the energy required to transmit a message is proportional
to the size of the message, we would like ciphertext and plaintext to have the same
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length. For this reason we used Cipher Text Stealing (CTS) mode of operation. The
CTS mode behaves like the CBC mode for all, but it produces ciphertext whose
length matches the plaintext length.
4.2 Message structure
TinySec deﬁnes two types of messages, depending on the security features required
by the communication: only authentication messages (TinySec-Auth packet) or au-
thentication and cryptography messages (TinySec-AE packet). The TinySec-Auth
packet imposes some modiﬁcations to the standard TinyOS packet: the group and
CRC ﬁelds are removed and the Message Authentication Code (MAC) ﬁeld is in-
troduced to authenticate the message. The TinySec-AE packet, besides the MAC
ﬁeld, introduces two new ﬁelds named Src and Ctr. They are both used as variables
to deﬁne the initialization vector.
Hence TinySec packets, require a modiﬁcation of the structure of the TinyOS pack-
ets. Indeed MAC, Src and Ctr ﬁelds have to be added, and the group and CRC
ﬁelds are no longer required. For this reason, TinySec packets are slightly longer
than TinyOS ones and thus in general require more energy for transmission.
On the contrary, in our solution we do not modify the message size. We use a
standard TinyOS packet, just using two bytes of the payload to store the IV (16
bits). This solution has the beneﬁt of minimizing the impact on the communication
layer. Indeed all the operation on the IV are performed at application layer. Fur-
thermore observe that since we only work on the payload, we are fully compliant
with TinySec.
4.3 AES as a TinyOs Module
Rijndael is well studied and there are eﬃcient implementations on a wide range of
platforms, such as 32-bit CPUs, 64-bit CPUs, cheap 8-bit smart-card CPUs, and
dedicated hardware. Nevertheless, as far as we know, there aren’t speciﬁc recom-
mendations for the implementation on 16-bit architecture, such as the Eyes node
platform. We implemented Rijndael in NESC, a C dialect which is the reference
development language on TinyOS. We based our 16-bit implementation on an 8-bit
reference implementation. We mainly focused on space optimization. In particular
we reduced the number of tables used to speed-up the computations in the Ga-
lois ﬁeld. Obviously the gain in space implies an increase in computational time.
We also carefully designed the code such that encryption and decryption functions
share as much code as possible. Finally we adopted few empirical “implementation
tricks”. For example we experienced a degradation in performance when nested for
were used, thus we replaced the inner for with the equivalent set of instructions.
AES cryptographic features are implemented in a new TinyOS module dubbed
AES. In ﬁgure 1 we show how the AES conﬁguration module (AESC) is connected
to the modules of a typical wireless communication application.
Our eﬀort was in designing a simple and intuitive system architecture. Pro-
grammers need only to work on the init function, to initialize the cryptographic
A. Vitaletti, G. Palombizio / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 71–81 77
Fig. 1. AESC is the module required to add AES cryptographic features.
CPU RAM FLASH
(bit/MHz) (Byte) (KByte)
MSP430 16/1 2048 60
ATMEGA103 8/4 4096 128
ATMEGA128L 8/8 4096 128
Table 1
hardware
module, and on the send and receive functions to encrypt/send a message and re-
ceive/decrypt it.
Init. The StdControl.init() function calls the AES.KeyExpand(Key,128) func-
tion that initializes the cryptographic module and generates the round keys from
the session Key.
Send. SendMsg() calls the AES.CTS.encode(msg.data,msg.length,seed) func-
tion. This function encrypts the message data using the seed as initialization vector.
The seed is placed in the last 2 bytes of the payload of the encrypted message. Ob-
serve that AES requires an initialization vector of 128 bits. For this reason, the last
bits of the seed are padded.
Receive The reception event ReceivevMesg.receive(TOS_MsgPtr m) calls
AES.CTS.decode(m->data,m->length,seed) which decrypts the incoming mes-
sage. The seed is obtained from the last two bytes of the received encrypted payload.
5 Performance evaluation
Although the standard choice when a block cipher is required is either AES or
Triple-DES, security architectures for sensor networks [6,9] implement ciphers such
as RC5 or Skipjack. These algorithms are assumed to be more suitable for software
implementation in embedded microcontrollers. In particular there are two main
concerns about the implementation of Rijndael on sensor nodes: it is often consid-
ered too slow and it requires more space in memory, if compared to RC5. The work
by Law et al. [7] prove that Rijndael can be quite fast.
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time (ms)
Size (byte)
8 12 16 20 24 444 40363228
15
10
5
3,75 ms
7,5 ms
11,25 ms
1,9 ms 
3,8 ms 
5,7 ms 
AES 
RC5 
48
Fig. 2. AES performance.
In any case we observe that most of the MAC and routing protocols for sensor
networks [16,14,11] exhibit latencies of few seconds for routing packets. This is
because these MACs exploit a short duty cycle (i.e. the fraction of time the radio
of a node is awake), to reduce power consumption. Time required to encipher a
typical TinyOS message by Rijndael is about few milliseconds.
In our opinion, this diﬀerence between the few milliseconds to encipher a message
and the few seconds to route the message to the sink, make Rijndael a suitable
solution for sensor networks. Indeed, Rijndael speed although important, might
be considered a secondary issue in an environment with the above latencies. On
the contrary, wireless sensor nodes require to focus on implementations of Rijndael
which are small in memory and energy eﬃcient.
In ﬁgure 2 we show the results of our experiments. The ﬁgure shows the time
required to cipher messages of diﬀerent sizes both with AES and RC5. The per-
formance of our implementation of RC5 are comparable with those provided in
TinySec, even if we have to stress that a fair comparison is quite hard. Indeed our
implementation runs on a MSP430F149 (4 MHz 16 bit) while TinySec runs on a
Atmega128L (8 MHz 8 bit), see table 1. Our implementation of AES encrypts 128
bit, with a key of 128 bit in 3.75ms, while RC5 requires only 1.9ms, with a key of
128 bit, 12 rounds and blocks of 32 bits. We recall that the AES implementation
in [7] is about 15Kbytes in memory size and encryption speed of Rijndael is even
better than RC5, while the AES implementation in [3] is about 9Kbytes, but speed
performance are quite poor. Our AES implementation requires only 241 bytes in
RAM and 3322 bytes in ROM. Hence, the size of our implementation of Rijndael is
about 1/3 of that in [3] and about 1/5 of that in [7].
Furthermore our current implementation of Rijndael allows us to encrypt with
key of 128, 192 and 256 bits. If we limit the length of the key to 128 bits, we only
need 177 bytes in RAM.
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6 Conclusion and future work
In our opinion, en-decryption speed is not the main constraint for a secure wireless
sensor network scenario. Indeed as long as latency of the WSN communication
protocols will be so high (few seconds), we will be allowed to spend few millisecond
to encipher a message with the AES algorithm. In this work we have presented
an implementation of Rijndael smaller in size than previous implementations (from
about 1/3 to about 1/5). However our AES implementation shows reasonable speed
performance (slower than RC5 by a factor 2). We plan to extend our work in order
to deﬁne a fully implemented end-to-end solution and to investigate the energy
eﬃciency of Rijndael.
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